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Measuring Misalignment: the Location of US Multinationals’ Economic 
Activity Versus the Location of their Profits 
 
Alex Cobham and Petr Janský 
 
 
Summary 
 
A major international effort – the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
initiative – aims to reduce the extent of misalignment between the profits of 
multinational groups, and the location of their real economic activity. Recent research 
using balance sheet data has shown major misalignments, with a number of small 
jurisdictions capturing a tax base disproportionate to their economic activity, but has 
also revealed the limitations of available balance sheet data for lower-income 
countries. This paper uses survey data on the international operations of US-
headquartered multinational groups to expand the research to a broader group of 
host countries (albeit for only one home economy), and confirms major misalignments 
of profit. A small number of ‘profit-haven’ jurisdictions are seen to have captured a 
disproportionate share of total profits, resulting in serious disadvantages for most G20 
countries, regardless of income level. 
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Introduction 
 
At the behest of the G8 and G20 groups of countries, the OECD launched its Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative in 2013, with the specific aim of reforming international 
corporate tax rules so that they ‘better align rights to tax with economic activity’ (OECD 
2013: 11).  
 
The BEPS process reflects particular political pressures that arose after the 2008 financial 
crisis, from both public anger about perceived corporate tax avoidance, and policymaker 
concern over tax revenue.  
 
In addition, there are longstanding criticisms of the international rules for corporate taxation 
which date back to their inception in the inter-war years (Picciotto 2013). Conceptually, the 
major criticism is that the ‘separate accounting’ approach flaunts basic economics by treating 
individual companies within a multinational group as if they were distinct, profit-maximising 
entities. Practically, the major concern is that a serious misalignment may have emerged 
between the locations of multinational groups’ economic activity, and that of their declared 
profits.  
 
The BEPS Action Plan contains fifteen commitments that together may address some major 
flaws in the separate accounting approach. However, it has been criticised for failing to give 
appropriate space to alternatives: in particular, for the dismissal of further attention to profit 
apportionment methods that have the explicit aim of aligning profits with activity (see e.g. 
Durst 2013; Picciotto 2012). Nonetheless, one of the fifteen action points may mark an 
important step in research into this question.  
 
Action 11 commits the OECD to establish baseline findings for the extent of profit 
misalignment, in order to understand the scale of the problem and to be able to track the 
progress of the BEPS initiative over time (OECD 2015a). Such an effort will require the 
collation (and publication) of data on the global distribution of multinational groups’ declared 
profit, and on the location of their broader economic activity.  
 
This would be a significant step forward from the current situation of fragmented data 
availability – and would also make possible for the first time a full, global analysis of the 
potential redistribution of the tax base that would be implied by various formulary 
apportionment approaches. It is not yet clear, however, whether the OECD can find the 
necessary data to create the BEPS baseline (OECD 2015a). The public comments from both 
civil society and private sector respondents are (atypically) consistent on the need to collate 
and analyse the country-by-country reporting that will soon be required (OECD 2015b); but, 
at the same time, work on Action 13 has narrowed the intended provision of country-by-
country reporting to an extent that such collation would be impossible.  
 
Regardless of whether country-by-country reporting data are made available in future, there 
remains an important question of the current extent, and the specific nature, of profit 
misalignment. How big are the misalignments that the BEPS initiative seeks to address, and 
what are the distributional implications – that is to say, which jurisdictions are the main 
winners and losers in terms of tax base? 
 
A number of empirical studies use corporate balance sheet data for OECD countries, finding 
support for the hypothesis that international profit shifting in response to tax differentials is 
statistically and economically significant. Grubert and Mutti (1991), as well as Clausing 
(2003), provide early evidence for the US; Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Weichenrieder 
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(2009) and Loretz and Mokkas (2015) present more recent evidence for European 
multinationals. 
  
Similar evidence for developing countries is lacking, reflecting largely the scarcity of balance 
sheet data. Analysis of national-level data suggests developing countries may lose three 
times as much in revenue, relative to their GDP, as OECD countries (Crivelli et al. 2015). 
One recent study (Cobham and Loretz 2014) used the leading global balance sheet 
database, Orbis, to assess the misalignment between profits and location of activity, and 
simultaneously to consider the tax base redistribution that would be associated with 
apportionment according to various formulae that reflect activity more closely. The results 
show a clear pattern of misalignment to the benefit of a small number of profit-haven 
jurisdictions, and to the detriment of lower-income countries in the sample. Coverage of 
balance sheet data is, however, very poor for developing countries: the lower income 
countries in the sample are, for most findings, only from Eastern and Central Europe. Once 
minimum coverage criteria are imposed, most developing countries drop out entirely. In 
addition, the Orbis data are heavily over-weighted toward Europe compared to North 
America and Australasia (OECD 2015a). 
 
For that reason we present here a complementary approach. Where Cobham and Loretz 
(2014) provide results for globally-headquartered multinational groups but with limited host 
country coverage, the present study uses survey data with much broader host country 
coverage but for multinational groups from just a single country of headquarters: the United 
States. The choice of the US is due to the relative ease of data access, but also because of 
its importance for the global economy – including developing countries.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the dataset and outlines the 
construction of variables. Effective average tax rates are derived and presented, showing 
both a powerful global trend downwards, but also persistent and substantial cross-country 
variation.  
 
Section 2 sets out the broad issue: what is the distribution of profit globally, to what extent is 
it misaligned with measures of economic activity, and has there been a substantial change 
over time? We construct measures of misalignment, of which the preferred measure shows 
that misalignment with economic activity of the profits of US-headquartered multinational 
groups amounts to more than 20 per cent of the total, and – with the exception of the 2008 
financial crisis – has grown strongly over time, from a position of very little misalignment as 
recently as the mid-1990s.  
 
In Section 3 we present analysis of the country patterns of misalignment. We find that tax 
base losses due to misalignment with fixed factors of economic activity are not closely 
associated with per capita income levels (contrary to the suggestion from results for a 
sample of relatively higher-income countries in Cobham and Loretz (2014)). Instead, a small 
group of high-income jurisdictions have captured increasingly disproportionate shares of 
profit, while almost all other countries in the sample have lost out – including the majority of 
G20 members, both high- and lower-income countries.  
 
 
1  Data 
 
The data used come from the annual survey of (all) US multinational groups carried out 
since 1983 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This section presents the dataset, 
and outlines the main variables used in the analysis.  
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1.1 The dataset 
 
Generally, the US Direct Investment Abroad survey (USDIA) includes ownership by a US 
investor of at least 10 per cent of a foreign business. Financial and operating data for US 
multinational companies cover the activities of foreign affiliates and, for some information 
and years, also their US parent companies.  
 
The survey-based data cover the period between 1983 and 2012, with some changes in 
variable definition and in other information collected. Most importantly, data up to 2008 
include all non-bank US parents and majority-owned foreign affiliates, whereas data for 2009 
and forward include all US parents and majority-owned foreign affiliates.  
 
Despite these inconsistencies, it is possible to create the longest possible time series from 
1983 to 2012 (while recognising the possibility of an artificial breakpoint due to the 
introduction of banks). Data on US parents, however, are only available for 1994, 1999, and 
from 2004 to 2012. In order to examine the complete global pattern, therefore, these are the 
years of data used in our final sample.  
 
Although the data are gathered through surveys from individual firms, the publicly-available 
data are aggregated to country- and/or industry-level. We use the country-level aggregation 
to explore the pattern of tax at this level. The use of country-level data can lead to biases, for 
example from effective consolidation of underlying profits and losses,1 which unfortunately 
we cannot control for or even estimate the magnitude of. Access to firm-level data (currently 
only provided for approved researchers who are US citizens) could allow future research to 
assess the implications of these partial aggregations. 
 
The data have been used previously for research. For example, Blonigen et al. (2014) use 
the confidential, firm-level data to estimate the impact of bilateral tax treaties on investment 
behaviour of US multinational firms, allowing for differential effects of treaties across sectors 
that use homogeneous versus differentiated inputs with varying intensity; while Stewart 
(2014) and Clausing (2012) use the aggregated data to compare the effective corporate 
rates, and shares of total foreign income and employment, respectively. Furthermore, 
Keightley and Stupak (2015) used the BEA as one of their data sources to document the 
large problem of base erosion and profit shifting in the United States and elsewhere.  
 
The data are provided not as a single dataset but in a range of tables, which again differ a 
little over time.2 Some information is available only in some periods or years (often the 
benchmark surveys that take place every five years; the last one was 2009).3 While merging 
the data across tables, variables, countries and years, some information is inevitably lost. 
For example, since selected data are available for around 200 countries and country groups, 
but income statement data are available only for less than 100 of these, after merging we 
                                                          
1  The use of country-level data results in consolidation of underlying profits and losses across companies in a given 
country. This overall sum hides the underlying heterogeneity. In general, the consolidation of loss-making companies 
will depress total reported profit, biasing the average effective tax rate upwards, but with the current data we are unable 
to control for this or even estimate its likely magnitude. Future work by researchers with access to the company-level 
data should pursue this question. 
2  In the cases of sales and net income, for which we have two separate tables as sources, the information is identical in 
the two sources - with the exception of some tens of cases for each year between 1983 and 1988. The differences are 
generally small, and we opt to use the information for net income from income statement tables, because the foreign 
income tax variable is obtained from the same source; while for sales we take from selected data tables where the 
other factors of economic activity such as assets are also drawn. 
3  For example, data on various types of assets by countries are available only in the most recent period since 2009, and 
value added-related measures only since 1997; data on US parents (necessary for a full picture of profit alignment) are 
also more limited than that for foreign affiliates. Also, for some years (such as 1998), there is an addenda with 
information for additional variables or countries (such as in 1993 in table TAB30, the addenda includes data on taxes 
other than income and payroll taxes). We make no or only limited use of the information available only for particular 
years or countries, but this often very detailed information provides opportunities for further research. 
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continue working with the latter’s less detailed country disaggregation. Finally, where there 
are negative values of some variables in some years, we input zeros for these 
observations.4 
 
1.2 Measures of profit and economic activity 
The BEA data provide us with two main indicators of profits: net income and ‘profit-type 
return’, which is available together with other value-added measures since 1997. The BEA 
methodology describes the latter in the following way.  
 
Profit-type return is an economic accounting measure of profits from current 
production. Unlike net income, it is gross of U.S. income taxes, excluding capital gains 
and losses and income from equity investments, and reflects certain other adjustments 
needed to convert profits from a financial accounting basis to an economic accounting 
basis.  
(BEA 2014) 
 
We also construct a third profit measure, gross profit, which adds foreign income taxes to the 
net income measure. This is our preferred measure, since we are interested in the 
distribution of declared (taxable) profits.  
 
A further alternative would be to use the gross profit measure, but to follow the construction 
of profit-type return in excluding income from equity investments – since these are typically 
returns on investments in other jurisdictions. This approach is of interest to understand the 
derivation of profitability for US multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in particular 
jurisdictions (such as the Netherlands), where much profit is derived from equity investments 
elsewhere.  
 
As Lipsey (2010) noted, however, in an important assessment of the weaknesses of existing 
foreign direct investment (FDI) data for understanding the real patterns of global economic 
activity: ‘That definition leads to an understatement of the degree of distortion by excluding 
income from equity investments, one of the mechanisms for transferring income’ (Lipsey 
2010: S104). 
 
As such, we do not feel the picture shown by profit-type return is more accurate for the 
current purpose: ultimately, the income has been shifted to, for example, the Netherlands, 
and so we prefer the gross profit measure which captures this.5 Future work might usefully 
explore this point further. 
 
The profit measures, as well as other financial variables, are expressed in US dollars. We 
use the data from the BEA, reported in current, or nominal, prices. For each year the data 
are thus in the value of the dollar for that particular year and, for simplicity, we are neglecting 
inflation as well as exchange rate changes and using the BEA data as they are. 
 
Economic activity is generally thought of as comprising some or all of the following: 
employment (indicated by employee numbers and/or costs); assets (tangible and/or 
                                                          
4  These observations represent, of the final sample, 7% of observations for net income and for profit-type return; and 3% 
of observations for foreign income tax. In practice the global results do not differ greatly if we retain the negative values. 
5  The gross profit measure includes income from equity investments, with the associated drawback that some of the 
income from equity investments might be counted more than once if there are more layers of ownership in one country, 
as is common when a company is structured as a holding company. Unfortunately the BEA data do not enable us to 
allow for this double-counting; the alternative series which excludes equity investment income will substantially 
understate profit shifting. Again, future research with company-level data might shed some light on the potential 
magnitude of this issue. A particular concern is around jurisdictions with greater holding company activity, such as the 
Netherlands, where the profit shifting role may be relatively overstated if equity income is included.  
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intangible); and sales. The BEA survey captures each of these, to a more or less ideal 
extent.  
 
For employment, the data straightforwardly include compensation costs (wages) and number 
of employees.  
 
Recognising that intangible assets are commonly used to facilitate profit shifting, we are 
reluctant to use the BEA’s ‘total assets’ series, since any misalignment here is likely to 
understate substantially that with respect to tangible assets. Future work with company-level 
data may shed further light on this point. The dataset contains information for net property, 
plant, and equipment. In the absence of a superior alternative, we consider this as tangible 
assets and call it so henceforth. This is similar to the approach of Government Accountability 
Office (2008), who refer to this series as ‘physical assets’. Data for the US are available only 
in benchmark years (every five years between 1994 and 2009). In order to address this, we 
extrapolate the trend for periods in between the benchmark years, and in addition from the 
period 2004-2009 up to 2012.6  
 
There are a number of sales indicators in the data, with varying detail and coverage in terms 
of years, countries, and types of sales. While future work may explore further the potential to 
focus on ultimate location and to exclude related-party transactions, we use here the most 
basic measure: sales of foreign affiliates, without limitation in terms of destinations or sales 
to affiliated firms. The inclusion here of related-party transactions is likely to bias downwards 
the eventual estimates of profit shifting, since some of these transactions will be artificially 
priced for that purpose.7  
 
 Again, future work might usefully explore variations here.  
 
1.3 Average effective tax rates and summary statistics 
 
We construct average effective tax rates at the national level, as the ratio of foreign income 
tax to gross profit. Figure 1 shows the evolution of average effective tax rates for the United 
States, and for the average of all the other countries (weighted by gross profits). There is a 
clear downward trend for both, interrupted only briefly by the global financial crisis. 
 
  
                                                          
6  NB. We use the Stata command ipolate. As with any other extrapolation, this rests on assumptions of stability in the 
trend. Here these may be relatively close to the reality, since the trend of tangible assets is quite consistently growing 
for both United States (when we have data), as well as for the sum of tangible assets by all affiliates in foreign 
countries. 
7  Consider, for example, an intra-group transaction chain in which coffee beans are exported from Kenya to the UK, 
where this is booked as an underpriced sale to a Swiss entity, and an overpriced resale to the UK retail arm. Including 
intra-group sales will capture the depressed sales value in Kenya, and the inflated one for Switzerland. Excluding them 
completely, however, would see (final) sales recorded only in the UK, which in this example would be accurate for 
Switzerland but would further artificially deflate the apparent profit shifting out of Kenya (if sales is used as a measure 
of economic activity). 
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Figure 1 Average effective tax rates, US and all other countries 
 
Source: Authors on the basis of the BEA data. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics showing the proportion of profits and of each measure 
of economic activity. In addition to individual indicators of economic activity, we include two 
combination measures drawn from formulary apportionment measures developed for use 
with unitary taxation. Unitary taxation is the main alternative to the separate accounting 
model promoted by the OECD. The latter model seeks to tax each affiliate as if they were 
separate (profit-maximising) entities, and so faces the technical challenge of seeking to 
recreate prices for intra-group transactions as if they occurred at arm’s length. 
 
The unitary approach starts instead from the view that profits are maximised at the unit of 
the multinational group, so takes this as the tax base. The technical challenge is then to 
allocate this base between the various taxing jurisdictions in which the group has operations. 
While individual US states apply a range of formulae, Canadian provinces have one agreed 
formula, and the European Commission has developed another for the potential application 
of unitary taxation among its member states. 
 
The formula used to allocate taxable profit between Canadian provinces is an equally-
weighted split between sales and wages. The European Commission (2011) proposes a 
formula for the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), which is weighted 
one-third tangible assets, one-third sales, and one-third split equally between compensation 
costs and (number of) employees. In these ways, the two formulae provide broad measures 
of economic activity, appropriate for examining BEPS-type profit misalignment. For 
comparison, we include here a version of the CCCTB formula with all assets (i.e. including 
intangibles) – labelled CCCTBa, as opposed to CCCTBtg, which includes only tangible 
assets.  
 
Table 1 also includes the average effective tax rates for individual countries in 2012. Tax 
rates exhibit a substantial cross-country variation. For example, within Europe in 2012, we 
observe countries such as Spain and Italy with rates as high as 50 per cent, alongside 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands with rates of around 1 per cent.  
0
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Table 1 Summary statistics, 2012  
 Share 
(%) of 
net in-
come 
Share 
(%) of 
foreign 
income 
tax 
Share 
(%) of 
gross 
profit 
Share 
(%) of 
profit-
type 
return 
Share 
(%) of 
tangible 
assets 
Share 
(%) of 
assets 
Share 
(%) of 
sales 
Share 
(%) of 
em-
ployees 
Share 
(%) of 
wages 
Share 
(%) of 
CCCTBtg 
Share 
(%) of 
CCCTBa 
Average 
effective 
tax rate 
Rest of the 
world 
6.7 11.9 7.9 4.4 3 3.6 1.3 1.2 0.5 1.7 1.9 23.5 
Argentina 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 42.1 
Australia 1 1.3 1 1.2 1.9 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.1 19.6 
Austria 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 8.6 
Barbados 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 4.9 
Belgium 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 11.3 
Bermuda 3.9 0 3.3 0.8 0.2 1.9 0.3 0 0 0.2 0.7 0 
Brazil 0.5 1 0.6 0.7 1 0.5 1.2 1.7 1 1.2 1 25.9 
Canada 3 2.4 2.9 2.9 4.7 2.4 3.9 3.2 2.7 3.9 3.1 12.8 
Chile 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 35 
China 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.3 1 0.5 1.4 3.8 0.8 1.6 1.4 17.5 
Colombia 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 29.8 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 7.5 
Czech 
Republic 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 17.8 
Denmark 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 50.6 
Dominican 
Republic 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 33.2 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32.8 
Egypt 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 42.6 
Finland 0   0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  
France 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.1 26.5 
Germany 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.3 2 1.8 2.2 1.7 1.8 27.6 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34.9 
Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 18.8 
Hong Kong 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 8.8 
Hungary 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 13.9 
India 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 2.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 31.7 
Indonesia 0.5 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 33 
Ireland 5.8 0.8 5 5 1.3 2.2 1.9 0.3 0.3 1.2 1.5 2.4 
Israel 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 7.5 
Italy 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 48.8 
Japan 0.6 2 0.8 1.5 0.6 1.9 1.5 0.9 1.4 1.1 1.5 36.4 
Korea, 
Republic of 
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 18.3 
Luxembourg 4.6 0.3 3.9 0.3 0 3.2 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.1 
Malaysia 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 19.9 
Mexico 0.8 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.7 1.3 3.1 0.7 1.4 1.3 24.1 
Netherlands 8.2 1 7.1 1.1 0.5 3.6 1.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.9 2.3 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 12.4 
Nigeria    1.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.3 0.1  
Norway 1 3.3 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 38 
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Table 1 Summary statistics, 2012 (continued) 
Panama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 45.5 
Peru 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 39.6 
Philippines 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 18.6 
Poland 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 21.3 
Portugal 0.3   0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  
Russia 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 17.7 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.1   0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0  
Singapore 2 0.5 1.7 1.7 0.7 1 2.4 0.5 0.5 1.2 1.3 4.2 
South 
Africa 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 25.3 
Spain 0 0.3 0.1 0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 59.2 
Sweden 0.2 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.4 
Switzerland 2.7 0.7 2.4 1.7 0.3 1.3 1.7 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 4.4 
Taiwan 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 17.9 
Thailand 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 28.2 
Turkey 0   0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  
United Arab 
Emirates 
0.1   0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  
United 
Kingdom 
3.1 2.6 3 2.6 2.7 8.9 3.9 3.5 3.7 3.4 5.5 13.4 
United 
States 
48.4 58.7 50 60.7 71.4 59.8 64.7 65.6 76.2 69 65.1 18.3 
Venezuela 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 22.7 
Total (USD 
millions, 
thousands 
of 
employees) 
2059986 380860 2440846 1397359 4483430 53725972 16884396 35226 2322307    
Source: Authors on the basis of the BEA data. Note: series ‘CCCTBa’ shows the correlation of profits with a CCCTB formula 
using total assets; whereas ‘CCCTBtg’ replaces this with tangible assets, per the Commission’s (2011) proposal. 
 
Throughout the paper, we limit our findings to individual countries where data are available 
at the country level, and to one residual group that contains the rest of the world. 
Unfortunately the data availability is skewed against lower-income and African countries. 
When we employ the World Bank’s classification according to regions and income groups, 
valid as of July 2015,8 there are no low-income countries, six lower-middle income countries 
(Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Philippines) and only Egypt, South Africa 
and Nigeria (with limited data) from Africa with data for 2012 to be included in the presented 
results. While the data in theory have global coverage, the limited range of US FDI in smaller 
and lower per capita income economies is likely to give rise to greater data suppression 
here. The resulting limited availability of data for some groups of countries leads us to 
present the results for individual countries only, rather than by groups. 
 
The sample covers activity generating gross profits of around $2.44 trillion, or 3.3 per cent of 
the recorded world GDP in 2012 of $74 trillion (World Bank’s World Development Indicators). 
 
It is already clear that profit is not well aligned with many measures of activity – for example, 
China’s share of employees is nearly four times its share of gross profit; Italy’s share of sales 
                                                          
8  Each year the World Bank revises analytical classification of the world's economies based on estimates of gross 
national income (GNI) per capita for the previous year. As of 1 July 2015, low-income economies are defined as those 
with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of $1,045 or less in 2014; middle-income 
economies are those with a GNI per capita of more than $1,045 but less than $12,736; high-income economies are 
those with a GNI per capita of $12,736 or more. Lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income economies are 
separated at a GNI per capita of $4,125. 
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is three times its share of gross profit; Luxembourg’s share of gross profit is nearly eighty 
times its share of employment costs. This misalignment is the focus of this paper. 
 
1.4 Exclusion of ‘mining’ affiliates 
 
Data on foreign income taxes do not distinguish between standard income taxes, and 
payments that reflect natural resource rents. As such, these rents have the potential to skew 
the analysis – artificially suggesting that resource-rich countries receive a share of (gross) 
profit that is disproportionate to their actual economic activity. For this reason, we explored 
taking advantage of the country-by-industry disaggregation to eliminate from national 
averages the data relating to affiliates operating in the BEA’s ‘mining’ category, which covers 
oil and gas extraction, coal mining, metal ore mining, non-metallic mineral mining and 
quarrying, as well as support activities for mining.  
 
The sub-category of oil and gas extraction is responsible for most of the mining category in 
2012 in terms of affiliates’ net income and sales. There are data available at this level of 
detail for years 1994, 1999, and 2004-2012.9 The mining category is available between 1999 
and 2012, but not for 1994. In 1994 the petroleum category is available, but does not include 
mining (which stands as a separate category for parents, with no data for affiliates). Since 
the petroleum industry is responsible for a large share of the mining category, and no better 
alternative is available, we were required to treat the petroleum category in 1994 in the 
analysis below identically to the mining category since 1999.  
 
Overall we differentiated between eight industries, namely mining; manufacturing; wholesale 
trade; retail trade; information; finance and insurance; professional, scientific, and technical 
services; and other industries. In 1994 the data did not distinguish the two industries of retail 
trade and information, and so we worked with only six industries. 
 
An important complication here relates to data suppression. Since the reported data are 
suppressed when it might be possible to identify an individual multinational group, there are 
inevitably more suppressions when dealing with country-industry data than with country 
aggregates alone. As a result, the mining category is sometimes suppressed when national-
level data are available. Where possible, we generated national aggregates, net of mining. 
Where mining data are suppressed, we created the broadest possible national aggregate 
which excludes mining, by eliminating the total of all suppressed industries (i.e. mining plus 
other suppressed industries).10  
 
For each country and year observation, we eliminated the value for the suppressed 
industries across all variables for consistency, although this results in a small number of 
additional observations where estimates are not possible.11 For countries where data are 
suppressed, and only reported in (e.g. regional) aggregates, this additional industry 
suppression is not possible, and so the ‘residual’ reported in the results below does including 
mining – and so for the reasons above may show an artificially high level of positive profit 
misalignment.  
 
                                                          
9  From 2000 to 2003, data are absent for US income taxes paid by parent companies, and therefore it is not possible to 
include these years in the analysis. 
10  Again, we input zeros where negative values of some variables were implied by this elimination of suppressed values 
(this is the case for four observations only). 
11  Specifically, 9 observations in the case of net income, of which 5 relate to Nigeria; 45 observations for foreign income 
taxes, with the most frequently unavailable countries being Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates; 6 
observations for assets (half of these for Barbados); 8 observations for sales (half of these for Egypt and Nigeria); 3 
observations for employees (2 of these for Barbados); and 2 observations for wages (Barbados and United Arab 
Emirates). 
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Table 2 shows the proportion of the full sample that would be retained after performing the 
necessary exclusions, across the main variables. Across the sample years, this results in 
excluding around 20 per cent of the total, by profit; less in terms of variables reflecting 
activity. In 2012, the remaining sample relates to $2.013 trillion of gross profit, 82 per cent of 
the recorded total of $2.440 trillion.  
 
Table 2 Sample coverage (% of full sample, 2012) after mining sector exclusion  
 Net income  
(%, $US m) 
Foreign 
income tax 
(%, $US m) 
Gross profit  
(%, $US m) 
Total 
assets  
(%, $US m) 
Sales  
(%, $US m) 
Employees 
(%, 
thousands) 
Wages 
(%, $US 
m) 
1994 93 92 92 91 89 97 95 
1999 92 92 92 95 93 93 94 
2004 85 87 85 93 95 95 97 
2005 79 87 80 91 93 94 95 
2006 80 86 81 89 92 92 95 
2007 76 87 78 90 91 92 95 
2008 71 79 73 88 89 91 92 
2009 79 89 81 91 96 95 97 
2010 78 87 80 91 96 96 96 
2011 82 86 83 90 96 94 96 
2012 81 89 82 91 96 96 97 
Totals 
after 
exclusion 
1667439 338810 2013160 49136152 16223026 33850 2253733 
Memo: 
Full 
sample 
totals  
2059986 380860 2440846 53725972 16884396 35226 2322307 
Source: Authors on the basis of the BEA data. 
As the shares of tax relative to gross profit demonstrate, including mining – rather than 
performing this exclusion process - can result in substantial distortion, in particular in 
creating a possibly artificial appearance of profit shifting into major resource-rich economies, 
since the resource rents in question tend to be large in relation to the standard corporate 
income tax seen elsewhere.  
 
On the other side of the scales, however, we weigh the very large loss of data; the fact that 
our exclusions necessarily include industries beyond mining, in an inconsistent way across 
countries, making direct comparison problematic; and the additional issue that our residual 
category includes mining, and so cannot be compared equivalently to the country-specific 
results. Finally, genuine profit shifting does occur in the resource sector – anecdotally, it may 
be the most widely abusive sector – so the overall argument for excluding this sector from a 
study of profit misalignment, even if it could be done perfectly, is unsatisfactory at best.  
 
On balance, the full sample is preferred and this forms the basis for the remainder of the 
paper.12  
 
                                                          
12  We are grateful to Kim Clausing for valuable discussion on this point.  
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2  Economic activity and global misalignment 
 
Broadly, misalignment can be conceived of in two main ways: either the relative intensity of 
the distortion, or in terms of the absolute scale of what is misaligned.  
 
The simplest way to capture the intensity of distortion depends upon the knowledge that 
perfect alignment of profits with economic activity would give rise to a perfect correlation 
(that is, of 1) between the series. A correlation of -1 would, equivalently, imply perfect 
misalignment (e.g. all the activity in one jurisdiction, and all the taxable profit in another).  
 
As such, we can show misalignment simply as the correlation of factors of economic activity 
with gross profit across countries, and over time. Figure 2 shows just this. As well as the 
correlations relating to profit misalignment with each individual factor of economic activity, 
we include two multiple-factor measures discussed above (the Canadian and CCCTB).  
 
Figure 2 Profit misalignment as relative intensity of distortion 
 
Source: Authors on the basis of the BEA data. 
Note: series ‘CCCTBa’ shows the correlation of profits with a CCCTB formula using total assets; whereas 
‘CCCTBtg’ replaces this with tangible assets, per the Commission’s (2011) proposal, and is used in the rest of 
the paper. 
 
Figure 2 shows global profit misalignment of US MNEs over time, in terms of correlations 
between profit and activity measures. Since a value of 1 implies perfect correlation, we 
define misalignment as (1 minus correlation). Misalignment as recently as the mid-1990s is 
near zero – suggesting that it is only in the last two decades that BEPS has become a 
significant problem. The extent of deviation from perfect correlation appears small, on any 
measure, even if the post-crisis level and trend are above those of the pre-crisis period.  
 
Co-movement across all the measures implies that misalignment has developed in much the 
same way in relation to any of the common indicators of economic activity. In addition, the 
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relative ranking of misalignment among the various measures of economic activity is broadly 
consistent – although closer inspection reveals that misalignment with respect to sales has 
become a more important feature over time.  
 
The financial crisis caused a spike in misalignment centred on 2008, although this 
presumably reflects the impact of widespread losses rather than a particular growth in BEPS 
activity. (Again, future research using company-level data should explore the precise impact 
on country-level results of individual company losses.) Aside from this spike, there is a 
common pattern since the mid-1990s of a growing trend towards misalignment. The post-
crisis rebound has returned misalignment levels to roughly their pre-crisis level by 2012; 
more recent data will be needed to explore whether or not the trend of growing misalignment 
has since been reversed by greater public pressure and tax authority scrutiny. 
 
The second type of misalignment measure reflects the scale of the distortion: in effect, how 
much taxable profit is in the ‘wrong’ place. The picture here shows that the relatively small 
reductions in correlation seen in Figure 2 are actually associated with large absolute 
misalignments (e.g. the correlation changed by about 0.2 in 2008, but this is associated with 
the near-doubling of the misalignment as estimated below).  
 
This can be calculated as the sum of either the (positive) ‘excess’ profits recorded in 
jurisdictions where there is not concomitant economic activity; or equivalently the sum of the 
(negative) ‘absent’ profits from jurisdictions with activity. 
 
The following formula shows how we estimate the profit for a jurisdiction – if the result is 
negative, we call it excess profit (since alignment would require its removal); if the result is 
positive, we call it missing profits.  
 
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
= 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
− 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 
Figure 3 shows the sum of excess profits by various measures of economic activity – that is, 
the total value of US MNEs’ additional taxable profits that would need to be declared instead 
in the jurisdictions that appear to lose out, in order to be aligned with their economic activity 
(which would lead to the correlation discussed above to be 1).  
 
Misalignment by this measure grows over the period from roughly 5-10 per cent of total 
gross profit in the 1990s, to around 15-25 per cent in the 2000s pre-crisis, through an 
artificial maximum of around 50 per cent during the sharp profit fall in 2008, and broadly in 
the range of 25-30 per cent since 2009. In other words, the crisis, and measures taken in the 
immediate years after it, does not appear to have reversed the sharp growth in misalignment 
since the 1990s. 
 
As with the correlation-based misalignment measures, the ranking is broadly consistent over 
time: the greatest misalignment among the most fixed components of activity (wages and 
employees, followed by tangible assets); the least misalignment among the components with 
the most easily manipulable location – sales. (Tangible assets become less powerfully 
misaligned than employees over the sample period.) The roughly midway extent of 
misalignment by tangible assets, compared to other activity measures, is responsible for the 
consistently close values of the CCCTB and Canadian measures, despite their different 
formulae.  
 
  
 
 
18 
Figure 3 The extent of profit misalignment (% of gross profits) 
 
Source: Authors on the basis of the BEA data. 
 
 
3  International distributional implications 
 
Of particular interest is the extent to which there are systematic distributional implications 
from misalignment. Does it result in overall lower tax payments by US MNEs? Which 
jurisdictions lose out? Which jurisdictions ‘win’, and by how much? Among countries that 
lose out, are the effects broadly comparable at different levels of per capita income? 
  
3.1 Tax payments and misalignment 
 
We follow the second approach to misalignment from Section 2, since this allows us to 
assess the distributional implications of misalignment at national level. Full alignment with 
economic activity requires that gross profit shares (the proportion of all US MNE gross profit) 
in a given jurisdiction match the share of US MNE economic activity. We calculate the ratio 
of these shares and multiply it by actual gross profit in 2012 to arrive at potential gross profit 
implied by the misalignment, which could be higher (or lower) than the actual gross profit. 
From this we subtract the actual gross profit to arrive at the additional gross profit (positive or 
negative) that would be declared, in the presence of full alignment.  
 
𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
=
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 
= 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 (
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
− 1) 
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Potential additional tax payments are calculated as the product of this additional gross profit 
and the average effective tax rate of the country in question. The latter is the ratio of actual 
tax payments to actual gross profit. 
 
𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 = 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
 
= 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
− 1)  
Since the country-level data aggregate both profitable and loss-making operations, note that 
the average tax rate calculated need not equate precisely to the average rate paid by 
profitable businesses only (which would likely in reality have lower effective tax rates than 
those reported here because of the higher tax base due to the absence of the consolidation 
of losses of other companies – so that while the rates calculated and used here are below 
statutory rates in most cases, for weak economies such as that of Spain in 2012 the reverse 
holds). In addition, this is a static analysis only, which cannot take account of behavioural 
changes were full alignment to occur – for example, in making more intense both the 
lobbying for lower tax rates, and the degree of competition for the location of investments or 
real economic activity. It is also important to note that real economic activity is likely to be 
substantially less elastic to changes in taxation than financial factors (Saez et al. 2012). 
Overall, these estimates should be treated as indicative rather than precise. 
 
Additional gross profits and additional tax payments are then calculated for the six definitions 
of economic activity. Those countries that exhibit lower shares of economic activity than of 
gross profit, we label as ‘excess-profit’ countries; those with higher shares of economic 
activity than of gross profit, as ‘missing-profit’ countries.  
 
Table 3 shows additional gross profits (the ‘excess profit’ measure), rising in absolute terms 
from around $25 bn-$50 bn in 1994, to around $600 bn-$800 bn in 2012, all expressed in 
current dollars.13 The broader measures of the CCCTB and Canadian formula provide a core 
estimate of misaligned profit, rising from $35 bn in 1994 to $670 bn in 2012.  
 
Table 3 also shows average effective tax rates of the two groups of countries, which are 
substantially lower for excess-profit countries. Note however that the difference in rates is 
lower post-crisis (6-8 percentage points, compared to 11-14 in the pre-crisis 2000s), while 
misalignment remains broadly stable after 2009.  
 
A possible interpretation of these patterns is that the sharp rise in misalignment after the 
1990s disciplined jurisdictions with high effective tax rates, driving down the differential. If 
such a response were intended to reduce the extent of misalignment (i.e. if ‘high tax’ 
countries chose to cut rates in order to grow the base), it has been almost completely 
ineffectual – at least in aggregate.  
 
The immediate impact of the crisis in 2008 is notably different too. In missing-profit 
jurisdictions, a higher proportion of losses among affiliates covered is presumed to result in 
artificial increase of the national average effective rate; while in excess-profit jurisdictions, no 
such effect on the rate is noted. 
 
 
  
                                                          
13  Note that adjusting for inflation would reveal a flatter, real terms trend over time. 
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Table 3 Additional gross profits, US$ m 
 Excess profit, US$ m Excess 
profit 
Missing 
profit 
 Tangible 
assets 
Assets Sales Em-
ployees 
Wages CCCTBtg CCCTBa Canada Average 
tax rate 
Average 
tax rate 
1994 -42985 -33204 -26657 -37564 -48496 -34564 -31046 -35792 0.23 0.33 
1999 -68187 -48977 -46516 -75032 -84596 -57944 -50087 -60339 0.18 0.29 
2004 -262862 -189187 -216095 -287553 -320635 -255823 -226811 -264771 0.11 0.25 
2005 -368345 -234593 -296021 -389837 -413684 -344078 -294958 -346553 0.11 0.24 
2006 -383870 -242332 -309946 -418556 -455081 -367334 -315502 -373624 0.12 0.23 
2007 -477370 -336532 -393963 -513618 -556056 -457235 -403267 -461661 0.11 0.25 
2008 -690200 -544686 -595311 -705200 -747502 -660961 -611852 -668908 0.12 0.41 
2009 -550349 -370018 -504802 -595767 -618240 -548290 -464671 -558388 0.11 0.19 
2010 -645302 -456286 -559705 -714955 -756646 -636101 -558179 -645850 0.1 0.18 
2011 -651489 -455850 -567095 -741386 -786824 -631768 -569084 -657281 0.11 0.17 
2012 -673528 -460091 -602293 -752913 -788369 -663815 -585539 -676674 0.11 0.19 
Source: Authors on the basis of the BEA data. 
 
The two panels of Table 4 show estimates of, respectively, the difference in tax payments for 
excess-profit and for missing-profit countries, were gross profits to be fully aligned with one 
of the six measures of economic activity.  
 
The estimate of excess tax revenue received in 2012 ranges from $25 bn to nearly $80 bn; 
the estimate of missing tax revenue is of course higher, ranging from around $80 bn to $160 
bn. The difference between the two ranges – i.e. roughly $50 bn to $80 bn – is the implied 
revenue gain of US multinationals and their shareholders, at the expense primarily of 
missing-profit jurisdictions worldwide. The revenue gains of excess-profit jurisdictions can be 
thought of as providing an estimate of the cost of bribing them into cooperative behaviour. 
Note also that the different economic activity measures provide quite different implied 
revenue gains for missing-profit jurisdictions – including the CCCTB and Canadian formulae 
– because while the scale of misalignment is similar for the latter two options, the 
distributional implications are quite different (and differences in tax rates lead to this showing 
large differences in implied revenue effects.  
 
Table 4 Additional tax payments 
a. Excess profit  
 Tangible 
assets 
Assets Sales Employees Wages CCCTBtg CCCTBa Canada Average 
tax rate 
1994 -8054 -8023 -5180 -7457 -10062 -6370 -6198 -7063 0.23 
1999 -8468 -9059 -5688 -9993 -11774 -6404 -6239 -7526 0.18 
2004 -17450 -24674 -18289 -25963 -31614 -20280 -21716 -24007 0.11 
2005 -27286 -28922 -25657 -34413 -38564 -27181 -26933 -30571 0.11 
2006 -30094 -33953 -30390 -39335 -47234 -31920 -32888 -37329 0.12 
2007 -33260 -44473 -36652 -43696 -54233 -37431 -39809 -43464 0.11 
2008 -71040 -76265 -69462 -76159 -87236 -72062 -73724 -78012 0.12 
2009 -41973 -41715 -46542 -51827 -58493 -46436 -42746 -51812 0.11 
2010 -43148 -46392 -49265 -58041 -66821 -50406 -48922 -56767 0.1 
2011 -52048 -59245 -58662 -69601 -80378 -57777 -59406 -66864 0.11 
2012 -51294 -59885 -60956 -68436 -78383 -59130 -60661 -67451 0.11 
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b. Missing profit  
 Tangible 
assets 
Assets Sales Employees Wages CCCTBtg CCCTBa Canada Average 
tax rate 
1994 14381 10390 9306 12590 16399 11767 10275 12296 0.33 
1999 22519 14079 15194 25414 26237 19237 16062 19510 0.29 
2004 65780 46007 55006 72001 79650 64309 56745 66383 0.25 
2005 86458 59824 68977 87926 98085 80184 70513 81991 0.24 
2006 85360 57278 70856 95193 104552 82694 73015 86221 0.23 
2007 121592 102547 102808 129567 147193 118732 111024 123021 0.25 
2008 311909 267771 272780 305309 342349 300834 286043 307227 0.41 
2009 102307 63249 94387 124877 120333 104978 88353 106654 0.19 
2010 116876 81956 106731 137699 146425 120681 106476 125302 0.18 
2011 108992 82237 102675 143399 141978 113996 104308 119671 0.17 
2012 126297 84048 119670 161215 158732 132558 117141 136982 0.19 
Source: Authors on the basis of the BEA data. 
The losses for missing-profit jurisdictions have not, in the aggregate, risen to the extent that 
misalignment has increased – because the fall in average effective tax rates means that the 
implied loss per dollar of gross profit shifted out has also fallen.  
 
A simple comparison suggests that total losses are not inconsistent with the spot estimate by 
IMF researchers Crivelli et al. (2015), that base erosion and profit shifting by all 
multinationals (not only those headquartered in the US) might result in a worldwide 2012 
loss of around $600 bn. The IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey records the US as 
the source, in 2012, of around 16 per cent of the outward FDI stock (roughly $4.4 trillion out 
of a global total of $27.8 trillion). Extrapolating crudely upwards on the assumption that non-
US multinationals display the same propensity to shift profits, alignment with the CCCTB 
measure of economic activity would imply tax losses due to missing profits of roughly $650 
bn.  
 
3.2 Static revenue impact: the winners and losers 
 
We turn, finally, to consider results at the level of individual countries. For simplicity we 
present results for a single measure of economic activity only at this stage, and we choose 
the CCCTB formula basis as the broadest combination of types of economic activity. Annex 
1 contains the full results for 2012, so alternative bases can be compared. 
 
Table 5 shows the relative scale of the major excess-profit and missing-profit jurisdictions. In 
the former, panel (a) shows that more than a fifth of excess profit cannot be disaggregated 
from the residual ‘Rest of the World’ category – jurisdictions which are not fully and 
individually accounted in the 2012 BEA data. Of the remainder, just four jurisdictions with tax 
rates of 2 per cent or below account for more than 90 per cent of the misaligned profit: the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Bermuda and Luxembourg. A further 10 per cent is due to Switzerland 
and Singapore, which have effective tax rates of around 4 per cent; and an additional 1 per 
cent of misaligned profits is due to Hong Kong, with an effective tax rate of 9 per cent. This is 
in line with the existing literature on international profit shifting, which indicates that the 
corporate tax base is sensitive to tax rate differences across countries (de Mooij and 
Ederveen 2008). 
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Table 5 Top ten excess-profit and missing-profit jurisdictions 
a. Excess profit  
 
Additional 
gross profits, 
$ bn 
Percentage 
of current 
gross profits 
Additional 
tax 
payments,  
$ bn 
Average 
effective tax 
rate 
Share of 
global 
excess 
profits  
Share of 
global excess 
profits 
(individual 
countries 
only) 
Rest of the world -151.2 -78% -35.5 23% 23%  
1 Netherlands -151.8 -88% -3.5 2% 23% 30% 
2 Ireland -93.6 -77% -2.2 2% 14% 18% 
3 Luxembourg -93.6 -97% -1.0 1% 14% 18% 
4 Bermuda -76.1 -95% 0.0 0% 11% 15% 
5 Switzerland -38.5 -67% -1.7 4% 6% 8% 
6 Norway -22.0 -67% -8.4 38% 3% 4% 
7 Singapore -13.7 -32% -0.6 4% 2% 3% 
8 Indonesia -7.3 -51% -2.4 33% 1% 1% 
9 Hong Kong -3.9 -28% -0.3 9% 1% 1% 
10 Denmark -2.8 -50% -1.4 51% 0% 1% 
Memo: All other 
individual countries -9.3 -31% -2.1 20% 1% 2% 
Memo refers to Venezuela, Egypt, Barbados, Israel, Malaysia, Peru and Sweden. Memo values are sums except for 
percentage of gross profits and tax rate, which are unweighted averages. 
Source: Authors on the basis of the BEA data. 
 
b. Missing profit  
 
Missing 
gross profits, 
$ bn 
Percentage 
of current 
gross profits 
Missing tax 
payments, 
$ bn 
Average 
effective tax 
rate 
Share of 
global 
missing 
profits  
Share of 
global 
missing 
profits (ex. 
US) 
United States 463.0 38% 84.8 18% 71%  
Germany 25.8 154% 7.1 28% 4% 14% 
Canada 23.5 33% 3.0 13% 4% 13% 
China 15.0 65% 2.6 17% 2% 8% 
Brazil 14.3 98% 3.7 26% 2% 8% 
France 13.9 110% 3.7 27% 2% 7% 
Mexico 13.7 64% 3.3 24% 2% 7% 
India 11.4 184% 3.6 32% 2% 6% 
United Kingdom 9.2 12% 1.2 13% 1% 5% 
Italy 8.6 187% 4.2 49% 1% 5% 
Spain 8.2 496% 4.9 59% 1% 4% 
Memo: All other 
individual countries 41.5 103% 10.4 24% 6% 22% 
Memo refers to Australia, Japan, Poland, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Philippines, Korea Rep., Belgium, Russia, Czech Rep., 
New Zealand, Hungary, Panama, Thailand, Greece, Honduras, Taiwan, Costa Rica, Austria, Ecuador, Dominican Rep. and 
Colombia. Memo values are sums except for percentage of gross profits and tax rate, which are unweighted averages.¨ 
Source: Authors on the basis of the BEA data. 
 
The other countries identified in the top ten are not recognised in the same category: 
Norway, Indonesia and Denmark each exhibit effective tax rates over 30 per cent. For the 
first two, it is possible that natural resource activity may play a part in inflating the apparent 
share of gross profit. In the case of Norway, which accounts for the major share, the year 
2012 in particular is clearly anomalous with a major jump in gross profits. Further 
investigation is needed in this and the remaining cases, ideally with company-level data.  
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In panel (b), three features stand out. First, as expected for US-headquartered MNEs, the 
US is the biggest loser by far, accounting for more than 70 per cent of the total gross profit 
that is misaligned away from the location of the real economic activity that gave rise to it. 
Second, the range of major economies is broadly represented – from the BRICs to leading 
OECD countries. Third, the missing profit is in some extreme cases greater than that which 
remains – by a smaller margin in the cases of India and Germany, for example, and by a 
factor of four in the case of Spain and some smaller economies. 
 
Finally, Figure 4 shows missing and excess profit against the average effective tax rate, 
where bubble size indicates the total value of gross profit misaligned in each case. Excess 
profits are shown as negative and missing profits as positive – that is, these are the 
directions of adjustment were alignment to be imposed on the current position. The 
dominance of a small number of excess-profit jurisdictions (those with tax rates near zero, 
and excess profit near -100 per cent, i.e. most of their declared profit) is confirmed. The US 
is the largest loser in dollar terms, but many countries are missing higher shares of reported 
profit. 
 
Figure 4 Intensity of profit misalignment (% of current declared gross profits), and 
effective tax rates, 2012 
 
Source: Authors on the basis of the BEA data. 
Negative bubbles (indicated in white) show excess-profit jurisdictions where misalignment results in artificially 
high profits. Positive bubbles (in blue) show missing-profit jurisdictions where misalignment artificially reduces 
declared profits. Bubble size reflects dollar value of misaligned profit. 
 
Annex II provides some data on total tax revenue and on major areas of public expenditure, 
to support comparisons of the relative importance of the tax revenue potentially at stake due 
to profit misalignment of US MNEs alone. 
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4  Conclusions 
 
This first analysis of global misalignment patterns in the profits of US multinational groups is 
largely descriptive, but sheds new light on the picture. Three main findings stand out. First, in 
contrast to some previous literature, it appears that countries at all income levels are losing 
out to profit shifting, compared to the taxable profits they could expect, given the current 
pattern of economic activity and a scenario in which the OECD BEPS aim of aligning profits 
with economic activity were actually to be achieved. There is great variation among 
countries, however, both in terms of the absolute value of losses and their proportional 
importance. 
 
Second, the majority of missing profit from jurisdictions where real activity takes place ends 
up in just a few jurisdictions with near-zero effective tax rates – the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Bermuda and Luxembourg are the most important by far, and with Singapore and 
Switzerland account for almost the entirety of profit shifting that can be allocated to individual 
jurisdictions.  
 
Third, the issue is of first-order importance in terms of the world economy. The preferred 
spot estimate for shifted profit in 2012 uses the European Commission’s proposed formula 
for economic activity, and amounts to $660 bn, 27 per cent of US multinationals’ gross profit 
or approximately 0.9 per cent of world GDP. Depending on the relative scale of profit shifting 
among non-US multinationals, it is feasible that the issue reaches the accounting materiality 
threshold of 5 per cent in respect of global economic accounts. 
 
In addition, the level of profit shifting by US multinationals has been broadly stable from 2010 
to 2012 (post-crisis), and at a level notably higher than that which prevailed pre-crisis in the 
early 2000s (which was itself sharply higher than that of the 1990s). This is despite a 
substantial narrowing of the effective tax rate differential between missing-profit and excess-
profit jurisdictions, although tax rates do appear to be closely correlated with the resulting 
misalignments of declared gross profit. 
 
There are important caveats. Most obviously, the analysis relies on the public BEA data, 
which are aggregated at the national level and subject to many and varying suppressions. 
Further investigation of many specific points is needed by researchers with access to the full 
company-level data, and also on the general question of how aggregation of losses and 
profits within each country affects the findings. Additional work with balance sheet data may 
shed further light on the representativeness, or otherwise, of US MNEs for global FDI, which 
at this stage remains unclear. Finally, the limitations of a static analysis are clear, and the 
behavioural responses to full alignment are likely to be substantial.  
 
Future research with the current data should explore in more detail the changing patterns 
over time (for example, the emergence of greater misalignment with respect to sales than to 
assets; the industry-specific patterns, including around mining; the roles of specific individual 
jurisdictions; and falling average effective tax rates).  
 
This analysis also exposes, however, the paucity of high quality data with which to assess 
either the scale of base erosion and profit shifting, or the progress of the OECD BEPS 
initiative designed to curtail these corporate tax abuses. It has already been announced that 
the imposition of country-by-country reporting on multinationals will not be accompanied by a 
process to collate and analyse the data required – even at the aggregate level. Instead, 
BEPS Action 11 contains vague language on the possibility to consider some data 
aggregated and provided by individual governments. If unchanged, this represents a major 
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missed opportunity to make good use of valuable data where the compliance costs have 
already been accepted.  
 
In addition to preventing accountability for the OECD, its members, or the G20 and G8 
groups of countries that provided the mandate, such a failure of transparency would also 
prevent policymakers from improving their understanding of the nature and extent of profit 
misalignment, and most likely also hinder effective policy progress at the national level.  
 
The confirmation of the likely scale of misalignment here, and the extent to which most 
countries are losing out to a small number of jurisdictions, should focus minds on the 
importance of better data. Individual jurisdictions and economic blocs should seriously 
consider making country-by-country reporting public. At the global level, there should be an 
urgent revisiting of the decision not to establish a repository which would allow analysis by 
trusted researchers, and the publication of aggregate data annually. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex I  Detailed results, 2012 (additional gross profits; additional tax payments) 
 
Annex II  Scale comparisons: Relative importance of implied revenue changes  
 
 
 
 
Annexes are available online at: <http://taxjustice.net/scaleBEPS> 
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